Georgia Court of Appeals
In December 2021, a Georgia sheriff’s office investigator in an unmarked car conducted surveillance on a “suspected drug house.” When the investigator saw a pickup truck with a North Carolina tag leaving this house, he tailed the pickup truck. At the same time, the investigator sought assistance from local police, requesting that an officer pull over the pickup truck. The local officer who made the traffic stop heard the request on his radio. The radio communication conveyed that the investigator saw the pickup truck commit traffic violations.
As the local officer followed the pickup, he saw “the driver failing to maintain his lane[.]” The officer also knew that the investigator had already asked that a police K-9 respond to the scene. The officer initiated a traffic stop on the pickup, exited his vehicle, and walked towards the truck to speak to Ayala, the driver. The officer explained the reason for the stop and requested Ayala’s driver’s license. During this interaction, Ayala told the officer that “he had been avoiding potholes” while driving.
The officer walked back to his patrol car to run a check on Ayala’s license, during which time a backup officer arrived, spoke to Ayala, and had Ayala exit the pickup truck. After receiving confirmation that Ayala’s license was valid, the first officer asked the backup officer to check with Ayala regarding whether the address printed on his license was his current address. Approximately eight minutes after the first officer initiated the traffic stop—and just a few seconds after confirming Ayala’s address—a K-9 officer and dog “conducted an open-air sniff around Ayala’s truck and the drug dog alerted to the presence of drugs.”
During a search of the pickup truck, the officers located what seemed to be methamphetamine, and Ayala was arrested. Afterwards, the sheriff’s investigator swore out a search warrant for the drug house.
Ayala, who was charged with “trafficking methamphetamine and other drug offenses,” filed two motions: one to suppress the evidence seized from his pickup truck, the other to suppress the evidence seized from the drug house. Subsequent to the suppression hearing, “the trial court denied the motion to suppress in an order containing no express findings of fact.” The Court of Appeals (or “Court”) granted Ayala’s request for interlocutory appeal.
On appeal, Ayala argued “that the traffic stop was unlawful because it was an unauthorized pretextual stop that was improperly prolonged.”
The Court’s analysis cited its decision in a 2013 case, in which the Court reasoned that the police officer “observed what he believed to be a [lane] violation … of OCGA § 40-[6-48 (1) (‘[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane’). Because the officer witnesse[d] a traffic violation, the ensuing stop [was not] pretextual, regardless of the officer’s subjective intentions.”
Further, consistent with a 2019 Court of Appeals decision, the Court explained that “independent of the officer’s own observations, he was authorized to stop Ayala based on the collective knowledge of law enforcement officers providing reasonable, articulable suspicion that Ayala had committed traffic violations.” The Court wrote:
[T]he sheriff’s investigator testified that he observed Ayala fail to maintain his lane numerous times before requesting that a traffic stop be initiated. And the officer who initiated the stop testified that he heard over his police radio that investigators had observed traffic violations. So the traffic stop was valid based on the collective knowledge of the officers.
Ayala also argued on appeal “that the officer unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop by abandoning the mission of the stop to assist a drug investigation without reasonable suspicion to do so.” The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding “that the state met its burden of proving that the traffic stop was not unlawfully prolonged.” Regarding the length of the traffic stop, the state had introduced evidence “that approximately eight minutes elapsed from the time Ayala was stopped until the drug dog indicated the presence of drugs in the truck.”
The Court also observed that “[l]ess than a minute after the officer confirmed Ayala’s address on his license for purposes of writing a warning, the K-9 unit completed the open air sniff indicating the presence of drugs.” Therefore, the Court explained, the open air sniff did not “unreasonably prolong” the traffic stop. The Court contrasted the facts in Ayala’s case with those in a 2000 Court of Appeals decision that “after [the] officer had issued a warning citation and returned [the] driver’s license to [the] defendant, [a] 20-minute delay to wait for a drug dog was improper.”
Yet another argument made by Ayala on appeal was “that evidence of a phone call from the sheriff’s investigator to the officer about wanting to get into Ayala’s vehicle shows that the stop was improperly prolonged.” The Court was unpersuaded by Ayala’s contention, pointing out that “the call occurred while the officer was still in his vehicle checking Ayala’s license and gathering information for a warning.” Additionally, the Court cited precedent holding that “activity unrelated to the mission of the traffic stop that is done concurrently with a mission-related activity does not unlawfully prolong the stop.”
Finally, the Court reviewed Ayala’s contention that the search warrant obtained by law enforcement for the “drug house” from which the sheriff’s investigator watched Ayala exit “was not supported by probable cause.” Despite this contention, Ayala never presented evidence “that he had an ownership or possessory interest in the house.” Rather, “there was testimony that the house was owned by a woman with no known ties to Ayala, that the house was not registered to Ayala, and that he instead resided in North Carolina.”
In 2001, the Georgia Supreme Court opined:
Rights such as those conferred by the Fourth Amendment are personal in nature, and cannot bestow vicarious protection on those who do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place to be searched…. When an individual has no ownership or possessory interest in the premises, the individual has no expectation of privacy, and therefore, lacks standing to challenge the validity of a search.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling on Ayala’s motion to suppress. Ayala v. State, No. A25A1115, 2025 WL 2654950 (Ga. Ct. App., Sept. 16, 2025).
At about 10:25 PM on August 1, 2022, Ramirez was driving a white truck on a divided highway in Gwinnett County. According to the testimony of an eyewitness, a black truck pulled up in the lane to the right of hers as she waited at a red light. Ramirez’s white truck was “immediately behind the black truck[.]” While stopped at this red light the driver of the black truck revved its engine and, upon the light turning green, the black truck “took off at a very high speed,” with Ramirez’s white truck following close behind.
The witness estimated that both trucks were traveling “approximately 80 miles per hour in the 35 mile per hour speed zone.” The witness saw Ramirez’s truck move into the left lane, at which point the black truck cut off Ramirez’s truck. Ramirez then moved back into the right lane, as his truck and the black truck “approached a driveway entrance to an Arby’s restaurant, where a sedan was in the process of entering the roadway.” Ramirez’s truck then “collided violently with the sedan, ejecting an occupant.” The sedan’s occupant later succumbed to his injuries at the hospital.
Ramirez’s white truck was impounded and, subsequently, police obtained a search warrant to remove the event data recorder (“EDR”) from the vehicle. (An EDR, also sometimes referred to as an “airbag control module,” is installed by the vehicle manufacturer. The EDR device “records data including vehicle speed and brake and throttle application five seconds before an airbag deploys.”)
Given the death of the sedan’s occupant, Ramirez was charged with first-degree vehicular homicide, based on reckless driving. Ramirez was also charged with failure to wear a seat belt, having an improperly altered truck suspension, having an improper muffler exhaust system, and a spotlight violation. Ramirez filed a pretrial motion to suppress the data retrieved from his vehicle’s EDR, which showed that his truck “was traveling at 88 miles per hour before colliding with the sedan.” He also filed a motion in limine “to exclude testimony by the officer who extracted the EDR data.”
The trial court denied both of Ramirez’s motions and, after a jury trial, Ramirez was convicted on all counts except the spotlight violation. (Note: The driver of the black truck that fled the crash scene was later identified through business camera footage, “and admitted to committing second degree homicide by vehicle, among other crimes.”)
Following his convictions, Ramirez filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by the trial court judge. Ramirez appealed this ruling to the Georgia Court of Appeals (“Court of Appeals” or “Court”).
Ramirez’s arguments on appeal included his claim that “the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant application containing a falsehood;” and that “the trial court erred by allowing an officer to testify as an expert with respect to the data retrieved from an event data recorder (“EDR”) in his vehicle[.]”
Ramirez’s Search Warrant Argument
The affidavit to the police’s search warrant application stated:
On 8/1/2022 the vehicle listed above … was traveling eastbound on [Braselton Highway.] A [sedan] was exiting a parking lot on the south side of the roadway. The driver of the [white truck] claimed he was in the right straight lane behind another vehicle, and the [sedan] entered the roadway in front of him. Tire marks on the roadway indicate the [white truck] was straddling both the right and left straight lanes when he began braking. A collision ensued and the driver of the [sedan] was ejected from his vehicle. After being transported to [the hospital], he succumbed to his injuries and died. A witness on scene completed a witness affidavit claiming the [white truck] was racing another vehicle.
This search warrant will serve to obtain the saved electronic information from the [white truck], in hopes of assisting with the collision reconstruction.
The “falsehood” alleged by Ramirez was that, rather than having signed an affidavit regarding the trucks racing each other, the witness had actually made that statement orally to the officer who swore out the warrant. At the hearing on Ramirez’s motion to suppress, the officer testified that the eyewitness had spoken to him directly and told him “that the trucks were racing.” The witness’s statement to the officer was recorded on his body camera, video of which was played for the court during the suppression hearing.
While testifying at the hearing, the officer admitted that he made a mistake by writing in the search warrant affidavit that the witness had completed a written affidavit regarding the trucks having been racing each other when, in fact, she had told him that directly. In reviewing Ramirez’s argument, the Court of Appeals cited precedent “pertain[ing] to alleged falsehoods in warrant applications”:
[I]f a preponderance of the evidence at the hearing supports a finding of intentional or knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth, the trial court must then view the affidavit with its false material set to one side, and if the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.
The Court found that the trial court “did not err by finding the application sufficient to support the issuance of the warrant.” The Court wrote:
[T]he difference between a written affidavit and a statement to an officer by an eyewitness at the scene does not deprive the warrant application of a substantial basis for finding probable cause to believe that the white truck was involved in racing or reckless driving sufficient to justify the search of its EDR data. Whether sworn or not, the statement was made by a disinterested eyewitness on the roadside in the context of the immediate police response to a vehicle collision shortly after the witness watched the collision.
Ramirez’s Argument Regarding the Officer’s Expert Testimony
Under Georgia law (OCGA § 24-7-702 (b)),
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if:
Ramirez argued “that the officer ‘merely parroted the [EDR] data, which masqueraded as finished fact.’” The Court rejected Ramirez’s characterization of the officer’s testimony as a mere recitation of the data extracted from the EDR:
[The officer] began by explaining his qualifications to present the data, testifying that he had specific training and experience in the methods of accident reconstruction and retrieving EDR data. He explained what data the EDR recorded, what tools he used to retrieve it, and how the data was presented, including defining the terminology. Thus, as far as the officer’s training and ability to present the data, Ramirez has not demonstrated an abuse of the trial court’s discretion in recognizing the officer’s ability as such an expert.
In considering the reliability of the EDR data regarding the speed of Ramirez’s vehicle, the Court wrote:
[B]eyond merely presenting the EDR data, the officer interpreted and explained the data, applying his experience, training, and examination of the scene, and his opinion was reviewed by his peers. This record supports the trial court’s exercise of discretion to admit the officer’s testimony[.]
For these reasons, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Ramirez’s motion for new trial. Ramirez v. State, No. A25A1328, 2025 WL 2681750 (Ga. Ct. App., Sept. 19, 2025).
If an additional witness is needed for an ALS Hearing, the witness must be arranged for by DPS. The ALS Court only provides notice to the arresting officer. If a subpoena is needed to secure a witness’s appearance, contact Dee Brophy (dbrophy@gsp.net) for assistance.
The Department of Public Safety Legal Review is published with the approval of
Colonel W. W. Hitchens III
Legal Division
Joan Crumpler, Director Clare McGuire, Deputy Director
Dee Brophy, ALS Attorney
Nkenge Green, Open Records Attorney Manager Shanna Lewallen, Legal Intern
Send questions/comments to