DPS Legal Review

On January 12, 2022, Officer Jason Seibert was on duty in a marked patrol car and drove up behind a red Toyota Camry. Officer Seibert observed the driver of the Camry fail to use his vehicle’s turn signal when making a right turn at a stop sign. The officer also saw the Camry’s occupants “glancing in the car’s mirrors or turning around to look at him.” He also noticed that the occupants “were arguing with each other.” When Officer Seibert ran the Camry’s tag, it came back as “a ‘switched tag,’ meaning the tag was registered to a different vehicle.”
Officer Seibert continued behind the Camry for a few more turns, concluding “that its driving was ‘not typical[.]’” At this point, the officer activated his vehicle’s emergency equipment and pulled over the Camry. (Note: Seibert subsequently testified that his “basis” for conducting the traffic stop “was the driver’s failure to signal and the switched tag.”)
As Officer Seibert walked towards the Camry and attempted to say why he made the traffic stop, Chandler, the vehicle’s driver, “cut him off and asked what he had done wrong.” Officer Seibert noted Chandler’s apparent nervousness and defensiveness, including his shaking hands, quick breathing, and rapid speech. When Seibert asked whether Chandler was deliberately avoiding Seibert’s questions, “’he [Chandler] said he was because he doesn’t like the police.’” Chandler also disclosed “that he had ‘just got out’ of prison.” At this point, Officer Seibert realized that he knew that the other two occupants of the Camry had “been involved in ‘criminal activity’ before.”

Officer Seibert informed Chandler that the Camry had a switched tag “and that the owner of the tag had an outstanding arrest warrant.” Chandler then told Seibert that he was not the owner of the Camry. Next, Chandler gave Officer Seibert his driver’s license and insurance, in response to Seibert’s request. Before running a check on the license and insurance, Seibert asked Chandler whether “there were any firearms or knives in the car[.]” In response, Chandler said that he was a felon and “could not have a firearm[.]” Chandler also volunteered “that he was on his way to deliver a note to his wife because he was divorcing her for cheating on him. And he stated that he had his wife’s phone.”

Based on his suspicion that both the Camry and the phone “might have been stolen,” Officer Seibert asked Chandler to exit the vehicle. The officer knew that stolen cars often display switched tags; however, at this point, he had not yet “received a report of a stolen red Camry, checked Chandler’s license, or asked Chandler if the car was stolen.” Officer Seibert also had not yet run the Camry’s VIN, as his practice was to do so only after requesting the occupant of a potentially stolen car to exit the vehicle in question.
Chandler heeded the officer’s request that he step out of the car; then “Chandler asked if he could get a cigarette to smoke from his pocket and Officer Seibert responded that he could.” The officer explained that first—for “officer safety”—he would remove everything from Chandler’s pockets. Before Officer Seibert even attempted to empty Chandler’s pockets, Chandler admitted that he had a weapon on him. Chandler then removed a firearm from his waistband and handed it to the officer. Seibert then arrested Chandler.

Chandler was subsequently indicted in federal court for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. In a hearing before a federal magistrate judge, Chandler “moved to suppress the firearm that Officer Seibert found on him after he exited the car, arguing that Seibert violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures when Officer Seibert asked him to get out of the car.” Although Chandler did not argue that Seibert’s initial stop of the Camry was illegal, he maintained that the officer “unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion that an independent crime had been committed other than the alleged crimes that formed the basis for the stop.”

The magistrate judge recommended that Chandler’s motion to suppress be denied, finding “that Officer Seibert did not violate Chandler’s Fourth Amendment rights when he instructed Chandler to exit the car based on: (1) Seibert’s legitimate safety concerns; or (2) Seibert’s reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity, including that the car was stolen.”

The district court later denied Chandler’s motion to suppress evidence of the gun, agreeing with the magistrate judge’s recommendation. The district court then sentenced Chandler, who had accepted a plea deal on the firearms charge. Chandler then appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (“11th Circuit” or “Court”).

The United States Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”) has held that, “[a]s a sort of seizure, a traffic stop requires the police to have a reasonable suspicion that the occupants have violated a law.” The Supreme Court has also explained: “The lawful duration of a valid traffic stop is initially determined by the stop’s ‘mission,’ which is to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.” Further, the Supreme Court has found, “Ensuring officer safety ‘stems from the mission of the stop itself.’”
In a 2015 decision the Supreme Court determined that commanding a vehicle’s occupant to exit the car “is within the scope of an officer’s tasks incident to a traffic stop.” The Supreme Court explained that “‘an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions’ to safely complete his mission, which can include ‘requiring a driver, already lawfully stopped, to exit the vehicle.’” Following this precedent, the 11th Circuit concluded, in Chandler’s case: “Given the danger to officers inherent in traffic stops, Officer Seibert was permitted as part of his mission in the stop to take the ‘negligibly burdensome precaution’ of asking Chandler to exit the car so that he could address Chandler’s traffic violation.”
The 11th Circuit also noted that Officer Seibert’s decision to ask Chander to exit the Camry was supported by “the totality of the circumstances.” The Court concluded:
Before the stop he noticed the car’s switched tag, Chandler’s atypical driving, and the car’s occupants appearing to argue with one another and continually turning around or looking through the mirrors to look at the officer’s patrol car. During the stop he witnessed Chandler’s defensive behavior, his admission to having just been released from prison, and the presence of two passengers whom Officer Seibert knew had previously been involved in criminal activity. Not only did Officer Seibert have personal knowledge that Chandler had violated multiple traffic laws but, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the government [which was the prevailing party in district court], we conclude that the district court correctly found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the car Chandler was driving had been stolen[.] Given the strong indications of ongoing criminal activity, it was reasonable for Officer Seibert to continue the investigation that started with a traffic stop by asking Chandler to step outside the car.

For these reasons, the 11th Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, finding no error in the district court’s denying Chandler’s motion to suppress evidence of the gun. Chandler v. U.S., No. 24-10660, 2025 WL 85338 (11th Cir., Jan. 14, 2025).

Georgia Court of Appeals

SEARCH WARRANT AND AFFIDAVIT FOR BLOOD TEST MUST DESCRIBE THE SUBSTANCE(S) TO BE TESTED “WITH PARTICULARITY”

On December 23, 2018 defendant Johnson crashed her car into a utility pole, causing the death of her passenger, Ms. Leath. A blood test performed on Johnson close in time to the crash was positive for “the presence of marijuana in her system.” A Fulton County, Georgia, grand jury indicted Johnson on the following charges related to the crash:
[O]ne count of first-degree vehicular homicide (OCGA § 40-6-393 (a)), one count of second-degree vehicular homicide (OCGA § 40-6-393 (c)), one count of DUI less safe (OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (2)), one count of failure to maintain lane (OCGA § 40-6-48), and one count of driving without a valid license (OCGA § 40-5-20 (a)).
Johnson filed a motion to suppress her blood test results, arguing that such results “were not authorized by the terms of the search warrant, which only authorized the testing of her blood ‘to determine the [extent] to which Ms. Johnson had consumed alcohol.’” The trial court denied Johnson’s motion, “concluding that Johnson lost all expectations of privacy in her blood once it had been lawfully drawn from her body, and the State could therefore conduct a warrantless search to look for substances other than alcohol once the blood was lawfully in law enforcement custody.”

In State v. de la Paz, the Georgia Court of Appeals “concluded that a warrant authorizing the drawing and testing of de la Paz’s blood for alcohol did not also authorize the testing of that same blood for drugs.” The de la Paz decision was issued on March 8, 2024—the same day that the trial court issued its order denying Johnson’s motion to suppress her blood test results.
Based on the ruling in de la Paz, Johnson filed a motion for reconsideration with the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court granted Johnson’s motion, and, therefore, the results of “the blood test for non-alcoholic substances [in Johnson’s system]” were suppressed.

The prosecution appealed from the trial court’s order suppressing the blood test results showing marijuana in Johnson’s system, on two bases: “(1) the trial court erred by concluding that this case is controlled by de la Paz; and (2) to the extent de la Paz controls, it was wrongly decided and should be overturned.” The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected both arguments put forth by the prosecution.

In its de la Paz decision, the Georgia Court of Appeals (or “Court”) wrote: A search warrant may issue only upon facts sufficient to show probable cause that a crime is being committed or has been committed. The warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized and the search must be limited to that matter described. Searches unsupported by independent probable cause that extend beyond the descriptions contained in the warrant are illegal. However, the particularity requirement must be applied with a practical margin of flexibility, depending on the type of property to be seized, and a description of property will be acceptable if it is as specific as the circumstances and nature of activity under investigation permit.
The de la Paz Court looked to the wording of the search warrant and its supporting affidavit and “concluded that it was apparent from that language that the warrant in that case was limited to searching de la Paz’s blood for alcohol and did not allow for the testing of other substances.” Further, the Court pointed out,
(1) the affidavit specifically requested that the blood samples be placed in an alcohol toxicology kit; (2) the search warrant similarly specified that the blood samples would be placed in an alcohol toxicology kit; and (3) the only enumerated crime in the affidavit, application, and warrant was OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1), which specifically denotes the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol.

For these reasons, the Court determined that the search warrant authorized a test of de la Paz’s blood for alcohol—but not for any other substances. In Johnson’s case, the Court of Appeals found that Johnson’s case was “indistinguishable” from the de la Paz case:

The search warrant in this case was predicated on the lead investigating officer’s observation of multiple signs that Johnson had consumed alcohol before the crash. The officer noted that Johnson had ‘a strong odor of alcoholic beverage on her person,’ and Johnson had admitted to the officer that she had consumed alcohol. The affidavit and application for a search warrant specifically noted that a blood draw was requested ‘for the purpose of testing to determine the [extent] to which Ms. Johnson had consumed alcohol,’ and it alleged that Johnson was suspected of committing the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol, less safe, as set out in OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1). The search warrant similarly noted that the blood test was obtained ‘for the purpose of testing to determine the [extent] to which Ms. Johnson had consumed alcohol,’ and it also specifically alleged that Johnson was suspected of committing the crime of driving under the influence of alcohol, less safe.

In Johnson’s case, the Court of Appeals stressed that it was not saying that an officer must secure two search warrants if they want to test someone’s blood for more than one substance. Rather, the Court quoted from the de la Paz decision, “[T]wo warrants are not required when law enforcement wishes to test a DUI suspect’s blood. One warrant will suffice, but that warrant’s terms and limitations must be honored by law enforcement and will be enforced by the courts.” (Emphasis added.)

Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to suppress “the blood test results for non-alcoholic substances [in Johnson’s blood].” State v. Johnson, No. A24A1559, 2025 WL 311834, (Ga. Ct. App., Jan. 28, 2025).