DPS Legal Review

Georgia Court of Appeals

EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT FELONY FLEEING CONVICTION

On October 12, 2020, Beckett, the defendant, was driving a borrowed white Kia in Athens, Georgia. While driving, Beckett came across Stancil, a woman with whom he was “in and out of a ‘toxic’ relationship,” driving her Toyota 4Runner (“Toyota”). Beckett pursued Stancil’s vehicle, resulting in “a chase through the streets of Athens.” Stancil called 911 to report the chase in real time.

An officer on patrol observed Stancil’s Toyota driving “‘kind of in the middle of the road,’ and the Kia ‘had kind of gone up on the end inside and…that’s where contact had been made’ between the two vehicles.” At this point, the officer turned on his patrol car’s emergency lights, and gave commands on the loudspeaker for both vehicles to pull over. Although neither Beckett nor Stancil complied immediately, “they slowed and ‘started obeying traffic [rules] and staying sort of in their lanes.’”

Soon after, Stancil pulled into the parking lot of Mama’s Boy restaurant, while Beckett continued driving. While talking to the police in the parking lot, Stancil told the officers about the argument between her and Beckett that preceded Beckett’s initially driving off in the Kia that he had borrowed from an acquaintance. Shortly thereafter, the police made contact with the owner of the Kia driven by Beckett, but not with Beckett himself.

Eight days later (on October 20, 2020), the police “arrested Beckett when he got into an altercation with Stancil at a hospital after he had been evaluated for unrelated health issues.” Beckett was identified as the driver of the Kia on October 12, 2020, and was ultimately indicted on charges including felony fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, among four others. At trial, the Clark County Superior Court judge directed a verdict on one charge (making terroristic threats against Stancil), and the jury acquitted Beckett on three other charges (family violence aggravated assault against Stancil “for ramming her vehicle”; theft by taking of the Kia; and hit and run). However, the jury did find Beckett guilty on the felony fleeing charge. Beckett appealed, arguing “that the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdict as to felony fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer.”

The Court of Appeals agreed with Beckett, concluding that “the record does not support a finding that Beckett fled the officer in the felonious manner alleged in the indictment.” (Emphasis added.) The Court explained that, per O.C.G.A. § 40-6-395, “the felony fleeing offense is, by definition, dangerous driving conduct that occurs after being signaled to stop.” The Court of Appeals wrote:

 

[T]he State had a burden to prove that Beckett, after being signaled to stop, (a) drove into oncoming traffic on Poplar Street, and (b) ran the light at Poplar and Oak Streets. Here, the officer who pursued Beckett initially described the vehicles driving recklessly, but he did not describe the indicted conduct as occurring after he initiated his blue lights[.]

 

The Court noted that the officer’s testimony

 

explained that the two vehicles were driving recklessly only during the initial portion of the events, but he clarified that he waited to turn on his blue lights until they ‘came around Mulberry’ (which runs between MLK and Poplar). When he did so both cars ‘started obeying traffic [rules] and staying sort of in their lanes … both cars slowed down … started to brake.’ This testimony is clear, and the officer did not equivocate on that point. The officer explained that he pulled behind the erratically driving cars on MLK but waited briefly to activate his emergency lights to ‘figure out if that was the vehicle they were looking for or if it was just a completely separate incident.’

 

For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed Beckett’s conviction on the felony fleeing charge. Note: The Court determined that, based on the evidence presented at trial:

 

Beckett committed the non-felony version of fleeing, which was not presented to the jury. OCGA § 40-6-395 (a) defines the non-felony version: ‘It shall be unlawful for any driver of a vehicle willfully to fail or refuse to bring his or her vehicle to a stop or otherwise to flee or attempt to elude a pursuing police vehicle or police officer when given a visual or an audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop.’

(Emphasis added.)

 

Beckett v. State, No. A24A0491, 2024 WL 3156495 (Ga. Ct. App., June 25, 2024).

United States District Court, Middle District of Georgia

COURT DENIES MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS AND BLOOD TEST RESULTS

On December 14, 2023, defendant Pratt was one of three occupants of a vehicle involved in a one-car rollover crash. The crash occurred on Fort Moore, a United States Army post near Columbus, Georgia. The first military police officer to respond to the scene was Specialist (“SPC”) Steiner. Upon his arrival, SPC Steiner saw the vehicle’s occupants “just as they were climbing out of the vehicle.” When Steiner asked Pratt who had been driving, Pratt said that she was the driver.

A second military police officer, Corporal (“CPL”) Booker, was dispatched to the scene, where he saw the vehicle “laying on its roof off [the] side of the road.” After CPL Booker asked Pratt what caused the wreck, Pratt said that she’d been using cruise control and then her vehicle “started to swerve when she went around the turn in the road. She stated that she attempted to regain control, but the steering wheel locked up, and the vehicle flipped and crashed into the wood line.” As he spoke to Pratt, CPL Booker noticed that she “was swaying and had slurred speech, so he asked [her] to perform standard[ized] field sobriety tests.”

Corporal Booker then had Pratt perform the Walk and Turn test and the One Leg Stand test:

During the Walk and Turn Test, Defendant started before she was instructed to, swayed off the established walking line, was unable to complete heel to toe, and counted from six to nine instead of starting at one. During the One Leg Stand Test, Defendant used her arms to keep her balance, she was swaying, and she was unable to complete the test, ultimately placing her heel on the ground at the count of one- thousand-seven. After determining that Defendant was likely intoxicated based on the results of the field sobriety tests, CPL Booker initiated a portable breathalyzer test, which indicated the presence of alcohol.

 

At this point, Pratt was placed under arrest for Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) of Alcohol, Failure to Maintain Lane, Driving too Fast for Conditions, No Seatbelt, and driving while her license was suspended or revoked. Pratt was then transported to Martin Army Community Hospital. After the federal implied consent law was read to her, Pratt signed the consent form and submitted to a blood test.

Pratt filed a motion to suppress her blood test results, arguing that the military police lacked probable cause to arrest her. She also sought to suppress any statements she made, asserting “that they were obtained in violation of Miranda.” Finally, Pratt moved to suppress “the event data recorder crash data obtained from her vehicle[,]” to which the prosecution had no objection.

 

1. Probable Cause

 

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals precedent stands for the proposition that “[a]n officer has probable cause to arrest a person when he has sufficient knowledge, based on reasonably trustworthy information, for a prudent person to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense.” This Court’s precedent also holds that “[a]lthough probable cause requires more than suspicion, it does not require convincing proof, and need not reach the [same] standard of conclusiveness and probability as the facts necessary to support a conviction.”

In Pratt’s case, the United States District Court, which is bound by 11^th Circuit precedent, found that the military police had probable cause to arrest Pratt for DUI. The District Court considered the “totality of the circumstances” in reaching this conclusion:

SPC Steiner was first to arrive on scene and was told by Defendant that she was the driver of the vehicle. When CPL Booker arrived on scene, he asked Defendant what happened, and she stated that she lost control of the vehicle while it was in cruise control. CPL Booker observed the vehicle resting on its roof off the road and Defendant’s physical condition, noticing that she was swaying and had slurred speech. CPL Booker then conducted standardized field sobriety tests and a portable breathalyzer test, all of which indicated the presence of alcohol and the possibility of intoxication. Additionally, SPC Steiner observed Defendant was unbalanced after the tests had been administered.

 

Since the police had probable cause to arrest Pratt “and federal implied consent was appropriately applied [,]” the District Court denied Pratt’s motion to suppress the results of her blood test.

 

1. Pratt’s Statements and Miranda

 

In its 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held “that warnings must be administered when the subject is 1) in custody and 2) subjected to interrogation.” A subsequent (1980) Supreme Court decision “expanded the meaning of ‘interrogation’ to include any words or actions by police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Yet a third Supreme Court decision held that “[w]hether or not a person is in ‘custody’ depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, assessing how a reasonable person being questioned would gauge her freedom of action.”

The District Court differentiated between statements made by an individual during a Terry stop, regarding which the United States Supreme Court held that “law enforcement officers may stop and briefly detain individuals for questioning upon having reasonable suspicion of criminal activity[,]” and statements made by a defendant interrogated while in police custody without having first been read the Miranda warnings. The Court explained that Pratt’s statements—which she made prior to arrest—“did not violate Miranda because they were made during a Terry stop.” Further, the Court noted, “At no point during these questions and statements was Defendant placed in handcuffs, detained, or placed in a police vehicle.” Rather, Pratt made these statements before CPL Booker administered two field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test.

The police had reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime (i.e., DUI) had been committed, “based on the nature of the accident and Defendant’s physical condition.” Moreover, the Court wrote, “the officers’ initial questions to Defendant were part of their immediate investigation into the crash. They were assessing the situation and ensuring public safety, which aligns with the scope of a Terry stop.” Since Pratt’s statements made prior to her arrest did not violate Miranda, the District Court denied Pratt’s motion to suppress on this basis.

Finally, since the prosecution did not object to Pratt’s motion to suppress “event data recorder crash data,” the Court granted this motion. U.S. v. Pratt, Case No. 4:24-mj-00008-MSH, 2024 WL 2804102 (M.D. Ga., May 31, 2024).