DPS Legal Review

U.S. District Court, Southern District of Georgia (Brunswick)

INTERVIEW OF FEDERAL INMATE BY FEDERAL AGENTS DID NOT REQUIRE MIRANDA WARNINGS

On July 22, 2022, Davis, an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in Jesup, Georgia, allegedly attempted to obtain postage stamps while incarcerated. Federal law provides: “Whoever being an inmate of a prison, makes, possesses, or obtains, or attempts to make or obtain, a prohibited object shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.” (18 U.S.C.A. § 1791 (a) (2)). The definition of “prohibited object” includes any object “that threatens the order, discipline, or security of a prison, or the life, health, or safety of an individual.” (18 U.S.C.A. § 1791 (d) (1) (G)).

Rationales for postage stamps being “prohibited objects” include the fact that stamps are used as a form of currency or “underground money” in prisons. Therefore, inmates’ ability to purchase stamps is strictly controlled. The Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) provides that “Wardens shall ensure that the inmate commissary has postage stamps available for purchase by inmates.” The CFR also states: “Inmates may not be permitted to receive stamps or stamped items (e.g., envelopes embossed with stamps, postal cards with postage affixed) other than by issuance from the institution or by purchase from commissary.” (28 C.F.R. § 540.21 (a) and (j)).

On April 24, 2024, Special Agents Gerrol and Zeeb with the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General requested that inmate Davis be brought “to one of FCI Jesup’s smaller visitation rooms.” Bureau of Prisons Special Investigative Agent Justin David brought Davis to the visitation room. Once there, Davis “sat in a chair at a table” with Agents Gerrol, Zeeb and David. Before questioning Davis, Special Agent Gerrol asked Davis “if he understood that his participation in the interview was voluntary and that he was free to leave the interview at any time.” Davis answered “yes” to both questions.

Neither Agent Gerrol nor Agent Zeeb read Davis his Miranda rights “before asking [him] substantive questions.” During the interview the agents “asked [Davis] whether he purchased contraband while in FCI Jesup.” When answering the question, Davis “provided potentially incriminating responses, stating that he purchased contraband.” During the eight-minute-long interview, none of the three agents were armed and none “raised their voices[.]” At the conclusion of the interview, Davis left the visitation room “and returned to the typical prison environment.”

After Davis was indicted on one count of attempting to obtain postage stamps (“prohibited objects”) while imprisoned at FCI Jesup, his attorney filed a motion to suppress, “arguing that law enforcement officers interrogated [Davis] without advising him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona” and, therefore, “the Court must suppress all evidence stemming from the interview.”

In its 1966 decision in Miranda, the Supreme Court of the United States held “that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.”

must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

In Davis’s case, the Government argued that, even though the agents did not read Davis his Miranda rights, his statements were admissible under Howes v. Fields. In Howes, the Supreme Court observed that “[i]nterrogated suspects who have previously been convicted of a crime live in prison” and that “service of a term of imprisonment, without more, is not enough to constitute Miranda custody.” The Howes Court explained that “[a] person is ‘in custody’ for these purposes if he finds himself ‘in circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.’ ”

The Howes Court determined that a court must consider “whether ‘a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’” Additionally, Howes instructed, the court must consider “the location and duration of the questioning, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints, and whether the person was released after the interview.” In a 2012 decision, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals opined that “[o]ther relevant circumstances include ‘whether the officers brandished weapons, touched the suspect, or used language or a tone that indicated that compliance with the officers could be compelled.’”
After considering these factors, the Court concluded that “[Davis] had the freedom to depart.”

The Court wrote:

It is undisputed that officers told [Davis] that his participation in the interview was voluntary. The interview was short, lasting less than 10 minutes. . . [Davis] apparently wore leg irons, a belly chain, or handcuffs, but nothing in the record suggests that [Davis] was unable to leave at any time. Indeed, [Davis] left at the end of the short interview. The agents present at the interview did not carry weapons and did not touch [Davis] before or during the interview. There is no evidence that the agents acted in an intimidating or coercive manner, promised [Davis] anything, raised their voices, or made threats.
(Citations omitted.)

The Howes Court also concluded that, with respect to an incarcerated interviewee, a court must evaluate “whether the relevant environment presents the same coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” In Davis’s case, the Court concluded:

On balance, [Davis] has not met his burden in showing that the “circumstances surrounding the interview … exert[ed] ‘the coercive pressure that Miranda was designed to guard against.’ ” Ultimately, [Davis] was subjected to [a] brief, voluntary interview in a familiar part of the prison where [he] was housed. The interviewing agents did not threaten, intimidate, or coerce [him] into providing statements; [Davis] voluntarily participated in the interview.

For these reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the District Court deny Davis’s motion to suppress. United States v. Davis, No. 2:25-cr-14-7, 2025 WL 3464446, (S.D. Ga., Nov. 17, 2025).

U.S. District Court, Southern District of Georgia (Savannah)

DEFENDANT HAD NO EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN GUN AND BAG ABANDONED DURING HIS FLIGHT ON FOOT FROM THE POLICE

In May 2024, officers with the Savannah Police Department (“SPD”) were on duty in the area of 300 Lewis Drive in a marked patrol vehicle. The officers were part of an operation focused on “high-crime areas”. The officers considered the area of 300 Lewis Drive to fit that description. During their shift, Officer Payne, SPD, “saw an individual, later identified as [Allen], quickly move to hide behind a van upon noticing the officers’ car.” Payne considered Allen’s reaction to be “unusual.”

The officers proceeded to drive down the street and, when they turned the car around, Officer Payne noticed that Allen—who had a black shoulder bag– was still bent down behind the van. Payne “could not recall what exactly he said to Allen” when he “spoke to Allen in an attempt to detain him.” In response, Allen immediately fled on foot as the two officers, who had exited their patrol vehicle, ran after him.

Although the officers briefly lost sight of Allen, a concerned citizen pointed in Allen’s direction. Soon after, “the officers apprehended Allen at gunpoint, directed him to the ground, and handcuffed him. Allen was wearing an empty gun holster.” When Officer Payne asked where Allen’s gun was, Allen claimed not to have been in possession of a weapon. When Allen denied having a firearm, Officer Payne “threatened to charge him with ‘another’ felony.”
The officers, unconvinced by Allen’s continued denial, retraced his steps along his flight path. At this time the officers located “a firearm that fit the holster and the bag Officer

Payne previously saw Allen holding[.]” The bag’s contents included “Allen’s Federal Prison Release ID card, a loaded 9mm magazine for the discarded firearm, and pills that [the] officers identified as Xanax.”

Allen was subsequently charged in federal court with possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Allen filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the officers unlawfully pursued, detained and searched him. During the suppression hearing, three SPD officers testified on behalf of the Government: Officer Payne, Officer Reyes and Sergeant Mitchell. With respect to “the basis of the facts supporting Allen’s arrest and the seizure of relevant evidence,” Officer Payne was the only officer who saw Allen crouch behind the van and was the officer who “initiated contact with Allen.”

Despite Allen’s attorney contending “that Payne ‘cherry picked’ what evidence to remember and ‘selectively recalled’ important details[,]” the United States Magistrate Judge (or “Court”) who presided over the suppression hearing found Payne’s testimony to be “wholly credible.” The Court noted:

Payne testified consistently, confidently, and calmly regarding his recollection of the events of May 25, 2024—including his inability to remember the substance of his communication to Allen. The failure to provide exact recollections is reasonable since over a year has passed since the incident and there was neither body cam nor dash cam footage of the incident. The lack of body cam footage, too, does not implicate the credibility of the witnesses proffered.

The Court also pointed out that Allen “introduced no evidence to contradict or call into question the credibility of Payne’s testimony.”

The Court next considered the question of when the police’s “seizure” of Allen took place. In 2012, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals (“11th Circuit”) explained that “[u]nder the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs when a government actor, by means of physical force or a show of authority, restrains an individual’s freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” The Court observed that “even assuming that Payne properly made a show of authority, Allen did not submit to the showing and immediately fled.” Therefore, the Court reasoned, “Allen was not seized until he was apprehended at the conclusion of his flight.”

Next, the Court analyzed “each phase of the officers’ interaction with Allen to determine whether his ultimate seizure was lawful and whether the items found nearby should be suppressed.”

I. Officer Payne’s Initial Contact with Allen

The Court considered whether Officer Payne had “reasonable suspicion to effectuate a Terry stop[,]” which is “a brief investigatory detention by law enforcement predicated on reasonable suspicion that an individual is engaged in criminal activity.” The Court examined the totality of the circumstances to ascertain whether Officer Payne had a “particularized and objective basis” to suspect that Allen was engaged in criminal activity.

Allen contended “that he was ‘seized’ solely on account of a single lawful act—here, hiding from the police officers— and that such an act, alone, cannot create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” In support of his argument, Allen attempted to distinguish his actions from those of the defendant in United States v. Gordon. In Gordon, the 11th Circuit concluded “that the lawful act of quickly moving away from officers upon making eye contact with them, coupled with the officers’ knowledge of frequent unlawful activity in the neighborhood, gave the officers reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention.”

Although Allen argued that the facts of his case were dissimilar from those in Gordon, the Court was unpersuaded:

[B]ased on the evidence and argument presented by the Government, the facts are much more in line with Gordon than Defendant suggests. First, Allen’s startled and evasive conduct occurred at night . . . Next, both Reyes and Payne testified that they were in the neighborhood as part of a “total focus” designed to target high-crime areas and that they believed the Lewis Drive area was such a location. Last, the Government points to Allen’s prolonged hiding behind the white van, even after the officers had left the immediate vicinity, as further evidence of suspicious activity. Under the totality of the circumstances, Payne had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to attempt to initiate a Terry stop of Allen when he spoke to him.
(Citations omitted.)

II. Allen’s Flight and Payne’s Quantum of Suspicion

The Court explained that Allen’s behavior in response to Officer Payne’s verbal command “did nothing that would dispel Payne’s reasonable suspicion.” Rather, the Court stressed, “Allen’s subsequent conduct only heightened Payne’s quantum of suspicion.” The Court noted that, despite Officer Payne’s inability to remember his exact words to Allen and the lack of any bodycam or dashcam footage from his initial interaction with Allen, “If Payne did give a proper lawful command when he spoke to Allen, Allen’s flight undoubtedly gave rise to probable cause of conduct in violation of Georgia’s obstruction statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24.” Further, the Court determined:

Even if Payne did not give a lawful command, he mistakenly but reasonably believed that he did, so Allen’s flight still gives rise to a finding of probable cause. His mistake would be reasonable because he clearly testified that he intended to detain Allen regardless of how he responded to his initial verbal communication and, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable to believe that one’s words convey the speaker’s intent.

(Note: Although there was no bodycam footage of Payne’s initial interaction with Allen, Payne’s bodycam did record him telling another officer shortly after Allen’s arrest “that he told Allen to ‘come here.’”)

Therefore, the Court concluded that Officer Payne “had probable cause to believe that Allen had violated Georgia’s obstruction statute.”

III. Allen’s Arrest

The Court reasoned that, although no clear line of demarcation distinguishes a Terry stop from an arrest, “When the officers caught up to Allen, held him at gunpoint, and handcuffed him, they were effectuating a warrantless arrest.” The Court pointed out that Officer Payne’s threat to “charge Allen with an ‘additional’ felony if he did not reveal the location of his gun” supported the Court’s concluding “that Allen was arrested rather than merely stopped for an investigatory detention[.]” The Court wrote:

Payne’s threat makes clear that he seized Allen for purposes of arresting him and charging him with at least one criminal offense, rather than to dispel any reasonable suspicion.

Because the warrantless arrest of Allen was supported by probable cause, the search of his person was justified as a search incident to that arrest.

Evidence (the gun and the black bag) Discovered Along Allen’s Flight Path

The Court found that Allen had no expectation of privacy regarding the gun, which the Government maintained “he possessed and discarded along his flight path.” The Supreme Court of the United States has opined that, for a person to avail himself of Fourth Amendment protections, he must have “an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched or item seized.”

In 2010, the 11th Circuit explained: “To establish a reasonable expectation of privacy, the person must show (1) that he manifested ‘a subjective expectation of privacy’ in the item searched or seized, and (2) a willingness by society ‘to recognize that expectation as legitimate.’ ” Further, in 2025 the 11th Circuit explained that a person’s Fourth Amendment rights “are not implicated—let alone infringed—by a search of a thing or place in which he has no reasonable expectation of privacy” and that an individual forfeits any Fourth Amendment interest in property if he abandons such property.

As to whether Allen had abandoned any interest in the gun, the Court wrote:

When Officer Payne apprehended Allen and noticed he was wearing an empty holster, he repeatedly demanded that Allen tell him where his gun was. Allen repeatedly denied having a gun. In short, he verbally abandoned any interest in the gun upon Payne’s questioning. As such, Allen has not demonstrated a legitimate expectation of privacy in that property and lacks Fourth Amendment standing to challenge its seizure.

Along the same lines, the Court concluded that Allen failed to show that he had “a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag found along his path.”

The Court reasoned:

While the officers initially observed him holding a black bag, at which point he may have had a cognizable expectation of privacy in it, it was later found along his flight path.

Neither Allen’s Motion to Suppress nor his argument at the suppression hearing make any attempt to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag at the point officers discovered it along Allen’s path. Because he has not carried his burden to demonstrate such a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag, Allen lacks Fourth Amendment standing to suppress it.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ruled that Allen’s motion to suppress should be denied. United States v. Allen, CR425-057, 2025 WL 3477727, (S.D. Ga., Nov. 3, 2025).