DPS Legal Review

Georgia Court of Appeals

COURT DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN “SCIENTIFIC” HGN AND “NON-SCIENTIFIC” FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS 

On May 3, 2023, Officer White with the DeKalb County Police Department and her partner responded to a one-car accident in which a Honda Odyssey smashed into a guardrail on an I-285 exit ramp “and [came] to rest partially blocking the lane.” As Officer White walked towards the Odyssey, she saw Chambers, who was asleep behind the wheel. Chambers did not wake up, even after Officer White knocked on the vehicle a number of times.
Officer White then “walked to the driver’s side of the vehicle and opened the door, but Chambers still did not respond to [her] commands.” While Chambers remained seated in the vehicle, Officer White’s partner “began to perform a sternum rub on Chambers, and, after approximately five to ten minutes, Chambers began to wake up.” At this time, Officer White saw “an open can of a malt alcohol beverage” in the vehicle’s center cup holder. Officer White checked the can, which was “cold and half empty.”

After Chambers was awake, Officer White had him exit the Odyssey so that she could place the car in park, since it was still in drive. As Officer White spoke to Chambers, she noted his slow, slurred speech and “smelled alcohol on [his] breath.” When White asked Chambers “where he was coming from, Chambers claimed he was coming from the mall and believed that it was midnight. However, it was 5:10 a.m.”

White administered three standardized field sobriety tests to Chambers, which were recorded on video. On the horizontal gaze nystagmus (“HGN”), Chambers “exhibited six of six possible clues for possible intoxication.” On the walk-and-turn test, “Chambers exceeded the number of steps, and he failed to walk heel to toe.” During the one-leg stand test, “Chambers failed to keep his balance and lowered his leg[.]”
Chambers was arrested based on Officer White’s determination that he was a less safe driver. He later filed a motion to suppress the results of the three field sobriety tests. The trial court granted Chambers’ motion, finding that, although Officer White had probable cause to arrest even if field sobriety tests had not been administered, “[T]he three field sobriety tests were performed so deficiently that the tests were inadmissible.” (Note: Chambers challenged the administration of the field sobriety tests but stipulated “to the scientific basis” of the tests.) The State appealed from the trial court’s decision to suppress evidence of the field sobriety tests.
On appeal, the State argued “that the trial court erred in analyzing the evidence using a Daubert framework. As an initial matter, the State claim[ed] that Chambers did not argue that Daubert applied to his motion to suppress or at the hearing, thereby waiving the application of Daubert.” In response to the State’s contention, the Court of Appeals pointed out that, effective July 1, 2022, the Daubert standard—previously applicable only to civil cases—was extended to criminal cases.

Relevant Georgia law provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if:

(1) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(2) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data;
(3) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(4) The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

(OCGA § 24-7-702 (b))

The Court of Appeals was not persuaded by the State’s argument. Rather, the Court found, although Chambers’ motion did not include an express Daubert challenge, his substantive arguments “raised issues central to a Daubert challenge.” The Court explained:

For example, Chambers argued that “[t]he field sobriety evaluations in this case conducted by Officer White failed to follow the necessary procedures outlined by the NHTSA procedure manual and other relevant law enforcement guidelines.” Chambers explicitly stated that he sought to exclude the evidence because the proffered testimony was unreliable. Further, “[u]nder OCGA § 24–7–702, it is the role of the trial court to act as a gatekeeper of expert testimony.” As such, the trial court did not err by considering whether the evidence was admissible under Daubert, as codified in OCGA § 24-7-702.

Citations omitted.)

The Court of Appeals rejected the State’s contention that “the trial court abused its discretion by granting Chambers’s motion to suppress results of the HGN test.” During her testimony at the motion to suppress hearing, Officer White conceded that she “did not medically qualify Chambers prior to beginning the field sobriety tests.” The Court noted that, prior to administering the HGN, “White failed to medically clear Chambers, despite the fact that Chambers had just been in a motor vehicle collision.” Therefore, the Court concluded, “[T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that White failed to properly conduct the HGN test and by granting Chambers’s motion to suppress the HGN test.”

Regarding the walk and turn and one-leg stand field sobriety tests, the State argued on appeal “that the trial court erred by excluding the walk and turn and one-leg stand tests on Daubert grounds.” The Court of Appeals agreed, noting that, although Georgia courts “have not yet ruled on whether these tests fall within OCGA § 24-7-702, the Legislature instructed Georgia courts to examine federal case law applying the Daubert standard to aid in our analysis.” OCGA § 24-7-702 (f) states:

It is the intent of the legislature that, in all proceedings, the courts of the State of Georgia not be viewed as open to expert evidence that would not be admissible in other states. Therefore, in interpreting and applying this Code section, the courts of this state may draw from the opinions of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., General Electric Co. v. Joiner, [and] Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael; and other cases in federal courts applying the standards announced by the United States Supreme Court in these cases.

(Citations omitted.)

In reviewing federal caselaw, the Court discovered that “Federal courts have found that, unlike the HGN test, ‘the one-leg stand and walk and turn test are not scientific tests and consequently are not subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 702.’” In a 2008 decision, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California explained:

Because psychomotor field sobriety tests [such as walk and turn and one-leg stand] are considered non-scientific or non-technical in nature, a description of the test and a defendant’s performance on the test may generally be admitted into evidence as lay opinion testimony under Rule 701, without the need for expert testimony.

In 2017, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia found that “the one-legged stand and walk and turn test are not scientific tests, but … the HGN is a scientific test[.]”
Based on its review of these federal court decisions, the Georgia Court of Appeals found that “the trial court’s conclusion that the walk and turn test and the one-leg stand tests were subject to Daubert requirements was in error.”

The trial court also determined “that, even if Daubert did not apply to the one-leg stand test and the walk and turn test, the tests were inadmissible due to unfair prejudice under OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”)[,]” which states: “Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”

The Court of Appeals determined “that the evidence of Chambers’s actions during the test, such as that he failed to keep his balance during the one-leg stand test and walked more steps than demonstrated in the walk and turn test, is relevant to the determination of his ability to drive safely.” Further, the Court opined, “While evidence was also presented that [Officer] White failed to properly administer the non-scientific field sobriety tests, that evidence addresses ‘the weight of the evidence from these tests and not … its admissibility.’” Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded, “[T]he trial court abused its discretion by concluding that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudice.” Finally, the Court cited 1996 Court of Appeals precedent that “evidence that the officer did not fully comply with NHTSA guidelines in the administration of non-scientific field sobriety tests ‘did not destroy the probative value of the tests[.]’”

For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision to grant Chambers’ motion to suppress evidence regarding the walk and turn and one-leg stand tests. State v. Chambers, No. A25A1301, 2025 WL 2778049 (Ga. Ct. App., Sept. 30, 2025).

COURT AFFIRMS DRIVER’S CONVICTION FOR VIOLATING GEORGIA’S “MOVE OVER” LAW

A police corporal in Chatham County, Georgia, was on the right side of a highway while “assisting in the traffic stop of a car that was being towed from the scene.” Another police officer, driving a marked patrol car, pulled in behind the corporal’s patrol car. The officer’s patrol car had its emergency lights activated. The officer saw a white sport utility vehicle (“SUV”) in the right lane, i.e., the lane of travel closest to the roadside where the two police vehicles and the car being towed were.

The corporal motioned with his hands for Ms. James, the driver of the white SUV, “to move over to the left lane or slow down.” The officer who had parked behind the corporal reported that “James could not have moved over because of traffic in the left lane, but she failed to slow down and instead kept up with the speed of the vehicles in the lane beside her.” The officer also later testified “that the speed limit in that area was 55 miles per hour, that he estimated James was going at least 40 miles per hour, and that a reasonable speed for the circumstances would have been no more than 10 miles per hour.”

The officer then followed Ms. James with his patrol car’s lights activated. James entered a parking lot and pulled into a parking space. The officer walked towards James’ SUV and told her why he stopped her vehicle. The officer was wearing his police uniform and asked James for her driver’s license. In response, “James refused repeated requests from the officer to provide her license and to step out of her vehicle[,]” going so far as to back her car out of its parking space to drive away from the officer. Although the officer “pointed at [James] and ordered her not to leave[,]” she disregarded his commands.
The officer followed behind James’ SUV with his patrol car’s blue lights and siren turned on. The SUV exited the parking lot and drove onto a road. The officer’s blue lights and siren remained on as he tailed James’s SUV, which she “eventually stopp[ed] in a gas station parking lot.”
The police corporal who had earlier assisted with the vehicle being towed responded to the gas station parking lot to provide backup for the officer. Both the officer and the corporal repeatedly asked James to exit the SUV, but she ignored their requests. It was only after a third officer arrived as backup that James finally exited the SUV, at which point she was placed under arrest.

Subsequently James was charged with fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, unlawfully approaching a stationary emergency vehicle, and obstruction of a law enforcement officer. James opted to have a bench trial (a trial before a judge, without a jury). The trial court convicted James on all three counts, after which she appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals (“Court of Appeals” or “Court”).

On appeal James “challeng[ed] the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convictions.” Regarding the applicable legal standard on appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court has opined:

On appeal from a bench trial resulting in a criminal conviction, we view all evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s [judgment], and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. We do not re-weigh testimony, determine witness credibility, or address assertions of conflicting evidence; our role is to determine whether the evidence presented is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Georgia law regarding fleeing or attempting to elude the police states:

It shall be unlawful for any driver of a vehicle willfully to fail or refuse to bring his or her vehicle to a stop or otherwise to flee or attempt to elude a pursuing police vehicle or police officer when given a visual or an audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop. The signal given by the police officer may be by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren. The officer giving such signal shall be in uniform prominently displaying his or her badge of office, and his or her vehicle shall be appropriately marked showing it to be an official police vehicle.

(OCGA § 40-6-395(a))

Regarding the fleeing charge, the Court of Appeals wrote:

[T]the evidence at trial showed that the officer was in uniform and driving a marked patrol vehicle with its emergency lights activated when he first stopped James; that she ignored his commands not to leave that traffic stop; and that she then drove away from the officer as he pursued her in his vehicle with the lights and the siren activated.

Georgia law regarding approaching a stationary emergency vehicle states:

The operator of a motor vehicle approaching a stationary authorized emergency vehicle that is displaying flashing yellow, amber, white, red, or blue lights shall approach the authorized emergency vehicle with due caution and shall, absent any other direction by a peace officer, proceed as follows: (1) Make a lane change into a lane not adjacent to the authorized emergency vehicle if possible in the existing safety and traffic conditions; or (2) If a lane change under paragraph (1) of this subsection would be impossible, prohibited by law, or unsafe, reduce the speed of the motor vehicle to a reasonable and proper speed for the existing road and traffic conditions, which speed shall be less than the posted speed limit, and be prepared to stop.

(OCGA § 40-6-16 (b))

The Court of Appeals noted that “the evidence showed that James could not make a lane change as she approached the officer’s stationary patrol vehicle with its blue lights activated.” However, the Court continued, under the applicable legal standard (i.e., viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment), “the officer’s testimony [also] support[ed] a finding that [James did not reduce her speed to a reasonable speed under the conditions and she was not prepared to stop] before she passed him.”

The Court also cited the trial court’s finding that James “had to slow down to a point to where if the officers or the wrecker driver stepped out she could come to a complete stop. The evidence was overwhelming that she did not slow down to that speed[.]”

Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded, “a rational factfinder was authorized to find [James] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of violating [OCGA § 40-6-16].”

Georgia’s statute regarding obstruction of officers states: “[A] person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer . . . in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” (OCGA § 16-10-24 (a))

The Court of Appeals reasoned: “Here, the evidence showed that James repeatedly refused to comply with the officer’s lawful requests during the traffic stop that she provide her driver’s license, step out of her vehicle, and not drive away from the scene of the stop.” Further, the Court noted, “In addition to ignoring the officer’s requests during the traffic stop, ‘by fleeing from an officer who had a lawful right to question [her, James] at the very least hindered the officer’s [traffic] investigation and violated [the obstruction] statute.’”

Accordingly, the Court found that, under the applicable legal standard, the evidence “sufficiently supported” James’ conviction on the obstruction charge. James v. State, No. A25A1359, 2025 WL 2752821 (Ga. Ct. App., Sept. 29, 2025).