Georgia Court of Appeals

Trial Court Correctly Concluded That Probable Cause Existed to Search Defendant’s Truck

On July 17, 2024, Jason Jones called Agent Stephen Pendergrass with the Georgia Bureau of Investigation after he was “stopped for a suspected traffic violation.” Months prior, Agent Pendergrass gave Jones his phone number because Jones had previously expressed interest in becoming a confidential informant.

Earlier on the same day, Pendergrass received a tip from a confidential informant (CI) who provided information about Jones. The informant said that Jones “picked up a half kilogram of methamphetamine in the Atlanta area” and was driving a Toyota Tacoma truck with plans to travel to his girlfriend’s apartment complex in Catoosa County. The informant also provided a photo of the license plate for Jones’s truck, which was verified as registered to Jones. On the tip from the CI, law enforcement officers surveilled the area around the girlfriend’s residence and initiated the traffic stop when Jones drove away in his truck.

During the traffic stop, the deputies observed that Jones “was acting nervously,” “refused to exit the vehicle,” and “kept trying to use his phone.” Jones called Pendergrass to “offer his services as a CI,” but Pendergrass, who was “watching the traffic stop from a nearby vantage point,” immediately ended the call when he heard “law enforcement attempting to communicate with
Jones.”

Jones was “eventually removed from the truck and placed in handcuffs” and was told “he was not under arrest but merely being detained.” Subsequently, Pendergrass arrived on the scene, asked if Jones knew why he was stopped, and Jones replied yes. When Jones asked to speak with Pendergrass, he was told by Pendergrass that “they could talk but only after he discussed the drugs in his vehicle. Jones then admitted having drugs in his vehicle.” Pendergrass arrested Jones and read him the Miranda warnings. Information regarding the drugs was provided, including the location of the drugs in the vehicle. A search of the vehicle revealed “five to six bags containing one ounce each of methamphetamine, digital scales, smoking devices, and other drug-related objects.”

Jones filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the traffic stop and the motion was denied by the trial court. Jones was “convicted of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and trafficking methamphetamine.” Jones appealed.

On appeal, Jones argued that “law enforcement lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop his vehicle based solely on the information from the CI.” Jones maintained that statements to Pendergrass at the time of his arrest “could not provide probable cause for officers to conduct a warrantless search of his vehicle because they were not made voluntarily.” He argued that his statements were made “with the hope of benefit –  i.e., that any drug charges would be reduced or eliminated in exchange for acting as a CI,” and thus, their admission would violate O.C.G.A. § 24-8-824.

The Court of Appeals looked to the decision in Garmon v. State, 271 Ga. 673, 676(2), in which the Supreme Court of Georgia held “an officer may make a brief, investigatory stop of a vehicle when he has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person stopped has been, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” And in State v. Jones, 287 Ga. App. 259, 260, this Court said the standard for reasonable suspicion is a “less demanding standard than probable cause.”

Both courts have generally held that “probable cause is ‘determined by the totality of the circumstances surrounding (1) the basis of the [CI’s] knowledge and (2) the [CI’s] veracity or reliability.’ And should there be a ‘deficiency in one, it may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability.”’

Notably, the CI in this case previously provided Pendergrass “with reliable information leading to four or five drug-related arrests.” On the day of Jones’s arrest, the CI provided Pendergrass with information on where Jones could be found, and the amount of drugs that would be found in the Toyota Tacoma truck, along with a photograph of the license plate. Given the sufficiency of evidence provided by the CI, the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop of Jones’s vehicle.

Jones also argued that his statements to Pendergrass at the time of his arrest were not voluntary and violated O.C.G.A. §24-8-824. According to the statute, “[t]o make a confession admissible, it shall have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.” Jones’s revelation about drugs being in the truck was not due to his belief that he would face reduced charges or that the charges would be eliminated, since “no overt promises were exchanged.” Instead, Pendergrass’s statement that he and Jones could talk “but only after discussing the drugs in his truck” could not objectively be “understood as a promise that he still wanted to work with Jones as a CI.”

For the reasons stated above, the Court affirmed Jones’s drug convictions. Jones v. State, No. A26A1194, 2026 WL 2252393, (August 5, 2026).

Georgia Court of Appeals

Trial Court Erred When Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Results of Breath Test

On the night of March 3, 2023, Je Lag Kim was stopped by a police officer for failure to maintain lane. Upon approaching Kim’s vehicle, the officer detected “a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage” and “noticed that Kim’s eyes were ‘bloodshot and watery.’” Kim admitted to having “two beers” to drink that night.

Initially Kim agreed to submit to field sobriety testing, but the officer ended the testing because “Kim was ‘unwilling or unable’ to perform one of the tests.” A portable breath test detected the presence of alcohol and Kim was arrested. After the officer read the Georgia implied-consent notice, he asked, “Will you submit to the state administered chemical tests of your breath and blood?” Kim answered affirmatively and the officer stated that he did not believe Kim had any difficulty understanding him. The chemical test results of Kim’s breath came back at more than 0.08 grams. Kim was charged with one count each of DUI-less safe and failure to maintain lane.

Kim moved to suppress the breath test results arguing an “unlawful administration of the Georgia implied-consent warning,” and stated that his consent “was neither knowing nor voluntary.”

Kim asserted that “the officer effectively deprived [him] of the opportunity to choose which test, if any, he would take.”

The trial court agreed and granted Kim’s motion to suppress holding the officer’s “decision to simultaneously ask for both a breath and a blood test was potentially confusing to [Kim] in a meaningful way,” because of the “different evidentiary consequences for refusing to submit to each.” The trial court also held that the “General Assembly intended for law enforcement ‘to request one test at a time,’ reasoning that the statutory implied-consent notice ‘specifically directs law enforcement to designate the chemical test – not test(s) – to which the driver is being asked to submit.”’ The State appealed.

The State argued that the officer’s reading of the implied-consent notice was not confusing. Also, the State maintained the consequences for consent or refusal of testing were clearly stated and the officer informed Kim of the option to refuse testing.

The officer cited the implied-consent notice in its entirety without further comment, threats or coercion, and by all appearances, Kim understood and answered the questions appropriately. Also, “there was no evidence of any impairment to Kim’s ability to consent.” The notice “accurately informed Kim that, if he refused any testing, his Georgia driver’s license or privilege to drive on Georgia highways would be suspended for at least a year and that a refusal to submit to blood or urine testing could be offered into evidence against him at trial.”

One exception to a warrantless search is valid consent. Accordingly, “the State has the burden of proving that the accused acted freely and voluntarily under the totality of the circumstances.” Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 817, 821. And according to Johnson v. State, 297 Ga. App. 847, 849,

“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness — what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect. The appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer[’s] request to search or otherwise terminate the encounter.”

Thus, in meeting its burden of showing valid consent and because the “asking for both tests did not render Kim’s consent to the breath test involuntary,” the trial court’s judgment was reversed. State v. Kim, No. A26A1564, 2026 WL 2277921, (August 7, 2026).