Georgia Court of Appeals

Trial Court Correctly Denied Defendant’s Motion To Suppress Results of Blood Test

On the morning of June 8, 2024, Jamie Allison Smith “was driving eastbound on a two-lane road when her car crossed the center line and collided with a westbound tractor-trailer” causing it to travel in the eastbound lane where it struck another vehicle, cutting it in half. Two of the occupants of the vehicle were ejected and died at the scene. A third occupant survived with injuries. “Data recovered from Smith’s car showed that she was traveling fifty-nine miles per hour five seconds before her airbags deployed, that her car’s lane-departure warning activated two and one-half seconds before airbag deployment, and that she did not apply her brakes before the impact.”

Georgia State Patrol Trooper Levi Perry, who was the first officer to arrive on the scene, stated that as he approached Smith’s car, “the odor of alcohol was immediately noticeable.” Trooper Perry further noted that Smith’s “eyelids were droopy, her speech was slurred, she was mumbling, and she was unsteady on her feet.” In her statement to Trooper Perry, Smith said her license was suspended and she had been drinking the night before and had stopped drinking at approximately 3:00 a.m.

Later, at the hospital, Trooper Perry arrested Smith for driving under the influence (“DUI”) and vehicular homicide. Smith was read the Georgia implied consent notice and was asked if she would submit to the state-administered chemical test of her blood. Smith responded “that she could not provide…an answer,” which Trooper Perry took as a refusal.

A search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of blood samples from Smith was ordered by a magistrate judge. The test revealed a “blood-alcohol concentration of 0.03 grams per 100 milliliters and the presence of both amphetamine and a ‘toxic range’ of methamphetamine.” Smith was indicted “for: (i) six counts of first-degree vehicular homicide — two counts alleging that she caused the victims’ deaths while driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe to drive (“DUI-less safe (alcohol)”) (Counts 1–2), two counts premised on reckless driving (Counts 3–4), and two counts premised on DUI-less safe (combined influence) (Counts 5–6); (ii) three counts of serious injury by vehicle, premised on injuries sustained by the Nissan’s surviving passenger (Counts 7–9); and (iii) one count each of DUI-less safe (alcohol) (Count 10), DUI-less safe (combined influence) (Count 11), driving with a suspended license (Count 12), reckless driving (Count 13), distracted driving (Count 14), failure to maintain lane (Count 15), and driving on the wrong side of the road (Count 16).”

The trial court denied Smith’s motion to suppress the results of her blood test and a bench trial followed. Smith was found “guilty of four of the vehicular-homicide charges and DUI-less safe (combined influence), driving with a suspended license, reckless driving, distracted driving, failure to maintain lane, and driving on the wrong side of the road.” The court vacated two of the vehicular-homicide charges and “merged the DUI-less safe (combined influence) charge into one of the remaining vehicular-homicide convictions.” The court also “merged the charges for failure to maintain lane and driving on the wrong side of the road into the reckless-driving conviction” which resulted in a total sentence of 15 years in prison, followed by 15 years of probation.

On appeal, among other issues, Smith challenged the denial of her motion to suppress the results of one of her blood tests arguing that the search warrant was too broad, “not supported by probable cause to believe that drugs would be found in her system and lacked the particularity required to authorize drug testing.” The Court disagreed.

“When a defendant moves to suppress evidence based on an illegal search, the [S]tate must bear the burden of proving that the search was lawful.” Leon-Velazquez v. State, 269 Ga. App. 760, 761(1). Thus, “the trial court’s decisions on questions of fact and credibility are to be accepted unless they are clearly erroneous,” whereby the court reads the evidence in the light most favorable to that ruling.

The general standards for issuance of a search warrant can be found in O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21(a). A search warrant is issued “upon a peace officer’s sworn, written complaint that ‘states facts sufficient to show probable cause that a crime is being committed or has been committed and which particularly describes the place or person, or both, to be searched and things to be seized.”’

According to the Court in de la Paz, 370 Ga. App. 853, 857(1), “when determining whether probable cause for a search warrant exists, a magistrate must make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, …, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched.”
Furthermore, “when a search warrant is limited to testing one’s blood ‘for alcohol, with no authorization given for the testing of drugs,’ and ‘the affidavit and application in support of the warrant make no request for, or mention of, the need to test the blood for anything other than alcohol,’ the warrant does not authorize the blood to be tested for drugs.”

Another trooper who responded to the scene, “submitted a combined affidavit and application for a search warrant for the testing of Smith’s blood.” Trooper Andrew Phillips confirmed that Smith’s blood contained evidence of DUI, first-degree vehicular homicide , and failure to maintain lane. In his affidavit, Trooper Phillips attested to his training and knowledge in the area of impaired drivers with regard to intoxicants such as drugs and alcohol, stating that they “can impair reaction time, coordination, and attention, all of which diminish [ ] an individual[’]s ability to safely operate a motor vehicle.” His affidavit also confirmed his training in the area of controlled substances and alcohol, and his knowledge “that evidence of consumption of intoxicants can be located in the blood and urine of an individual for a period of time after consumption and tested to determine level of impairment.”

The subsequent search warrant “authorized the search and seizure of a sample of Smith’s blood but did not identify the type of testing permitted to be done.” The trial court “found that the warrant was supported by probable cause and properly authorized testing for any evidence of impairment.”

As for probable cause, the affidavit/application submitted by Trooper Phillips “explicitly described both Smith’s multiple manifestations of impairment and how, in his experience, both drugs and alcohol may cause such impairment.” The information gleaned from his affidavit, “combined with the nature of the deadly collision Smith appeared to have caused, was sufficient for the trial court to determine that there was ‘a fair probability’ that her blood would” have evidence of driving while impaired.

Regarding particularity, Trooper Phillips cited the DUI statute with several subsections describing “different ways of committing the offense, including by driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, other substances, or combinations thereof.” Thus, “[a]s a result, different facts are required to prove the alternative methods of committing the crime.” de la Paz, 370 Ga. App. at 855(1).

The Court acknowledged that the warrant itself did not expressly limit the purposes for which Smith’s blood could be tested and read “in conjunction with Trooper Phillips’s affidavit/application – which explicitly described both Smith’s manifestations of impairment and how, in the trooper’s experience, both drugs and alcohol may cause such impairment – the search warrant necessarily authorized testing of Smith’s blood for both drugs and alcohol and limited testing to those purposes.”

Thus, the Court affirmed the denial of Smith’s motion to suppress. Smith v. State, No. A26A1099, 2026 WL 2029609, (July 14, 2026).

Georgia Court of Appeals

Trial Court Correctly Granted Defendant’s General Demurrer for The DUI Less Safe Charge  

On November 20, 2021, Don Morris received a uniform traffic citation (UTC) for “driving under the influence” in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1)-(5) but the citation did not state which substance impaired Morris, nor did it state the subsection he violated. Morris pled not guilty and requested a jury trial on March 30, 2023.

Morris was charged, via accusation on November 30, 2023, with one count of DUI less safe, alleging that he committed the offense of DUI less safe (a misdemeanor) when he “did drive and have actual physical control of a moving vehicle while under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe [for him] to drive.” The accusation was more detailed than the initial UTC.
Morris filed a general demurrer on February 27, 2025, “requesting that the trial court dismiss the accusation because the UTC filed in municipal court,” was insufficiently charged and the subsequent accusation was filed outside the appropriate statute of limitations. The trial court granted Morris’s general demurrer and the case was dismissed. The State appealed.

The Supreme Court of Georgia has held,

“To withstand a general demurrer, [a charging document] must: (1) recite the language of the statute that sets out all the elements of the offense charged, or (2) allege the facts necessary to establish violation of a criminal statute. If either of these requisites are met, then the accused [ ] cannot admit the allegations of the indictment and yet be not guilty of the crime charged.”

The UTC filed in November 2021 “described Morris’s ‘offense’ generally as ‘driving under the influence’ in violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1)-(5).” It did not recite the language of any subsection of the statute and also did not provide more details in the blank space on the UTC form.

In Heath v. State, 349 Ga. App. 84, 89, the indictment charged the defendant with causing the death of [the victim], through a violation of O.C.G.A. Section 40-6-391, Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, but the indictment did not recite the language of the statute that set out all of the elements of the offense. Because the indictment did not specify the manner in which O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a) was violated, the defendant in Heath “could admit the allegations of the indictment and yet not be guilty of driving under the influence.”

As in Heath, “the alleged charging document did not specify whether Morris was driving under the influence of alcohol when he was less safe to drive or whether he was doing so with an alcohol concentration that was 0.08 or more.” Thus, “the State’s argument that Morris’s vague traffic citation was sufficient to constitute a valid charging document” is barred.

The State next argued that the accusing document later filed in the State Court of Fulton County sufficiently charged Morris with all the elements of DUI less safe due to impairment by alcohol. However, because the accusing document was filed outside the statute of limitations, it also fails.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s granting of Morris’s general demurrer. State v. Morris, No. A26A0641, 2026 WL 1857513, (Ga. Ct. App., June 25, 2026).