On June 20, 2022, Elizabeth Petino was stopped on Highway 400 by Officer Zachary Smith, because of expired tags. Petino said that she purchased the vehicle within the last 30 days and believed she still had time to register the vehicle. However, Officer Smith informed her that the deadline to register the vehicle was 7 days and that deadline had already passed. Upon further questioning, Petino revealed that she had a prior arrest, but was not on probation or parole. At the officer’s request, she handed over her driver’s license, bill of sale and title to the vehicle. However, she could not provide proof of insurance. After running her information from his vehicle, Officer Smith established that her car was insured and there were no outstanding warrants in her name. He wrote a warning for the failure to register the car in a timely manner.
While Officer Smith was still in his patrol car, another deputy arrived at the scene and proceeded to question Petino regarding the origin and destination of her trip. The deputy described Petino as “talkative” to Officer Smith. Upon returning to Petino’s car, Officer Smith did not give back Petino’s license, title and other documents and did not offer that insurance coverage for the vehicle had been verified. Officer Smith instead asked if she had contraband in the car, which Petino denied. Officer Smith then said: “What I’d like to do is have my K-9 partner run around the car. He asked Petino if she was ‘good with that.’” Petino gave consent and was told to exit the vehicle. The K-9 alerted and the car was searched, revealing methamphetamine and drug-related objects.
“Petino was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug-related objects. She filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle, arguing that Smith had unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop prior to obtaining her consent for the search. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing,” finding “suppression was not warranted because: (1) there was no evidence that Smith deviated from the purpose of the traffic stop to investigate other issues; (2) Petino consented to the open air search; and (3) Petino was not detained any longer for the open air sniff than she was detained while Smith was awaiting information prior to determining whether to issue warnings.”
“Petino filed an application for interlocutory review of the trial court’s order,” which was granted and an appeal ensued. The validity of the initial traffic stop was not challenged by Petino. Instead, she argued that the officer “impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop and that her consent to search was therefore invalid.”
The Court of Appeals looked to the decision in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U. S. 348 (2015), in which the court held:
“A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation…Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are – or reasonably should have been completed.”
The Court of Appeals also looked to its 2021 decision in Hill v. State, in which the court held that “[I]f an officer continues to detain an individual after the conclusion of the traffic stop and interrogates [her] or seeks consent to search without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer has exceeded the scope of a permissible investigation of the initial traffic stop.”
The Court further looked to its 2024 decision in Snellings v. State, in which it held that, “[t]o detain a driver after investigation of the traffic violation is complete, an officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver was engaged in other illegal activity. And reasonable, articulable suspicion must be based on more than a subjective, general suspicion or hunch. The detention must be justified by specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the detention, and the officer must have some basis from which the court can determine that the detention was neither arbitrary nor harassing.”
As to Petino’s contention that the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged, the Court of Appeals agreed. The trial court incorrectly found that the traffic stop was ongoing at the time of the dog-sniff search because Petino was unable to provide proof of vehicle insurance. However, according to O.C.G.A. § 40-6-10(a)(3), “The requirement …that proof or evidence of minimum liability insurance be maintained in a motor vehicle at all times during the operation of the vehicle or produced in electronic format shall not apply to the owner or operator of any vehicle for which the records or data base of the Department of Revenue indicates that required minimum insurance coverage is currently effective.” Once Officer Smith determined through the state’s database that the vehicle was insured, Petino’s failure to deliver proof of insurance provided no legal justification to prolong the stop.
Verification of insurance coverage and the warning for failure to register the car, completed the purpose of the stop. Yet, when Officer Smith returned to Petino’s car, he did not hand over her license, paperwork, or written warning. Moreover, Officer Smith testified that he did not detect an odor of marijuana or other substances coming from the car, nor were Petino’s “red eyes” and “talkative” conduct alarming enough to conduct field sobriety tests.
Because the Court of Appeals was not persuaded that the officer’s continued detention of Petino was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, the court reversed the trial court’s “denial of Petino’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search.” Petino v. State, 379 Ga.App. 8 (March 9, 2026)
A number of issues were addressed on appeal in the matter involving a single use-of-force incident on July 10, 2018. One of the issues, qualified immunity, is the primary topic of discussion here. On that fateful summer day in Atlanta, Georgia, Officer Jon Grubbs and his partner observed Jerry Blasingame – a 65-year-old homeless man – approach a vehicle on the side of the roadway near an on-ramp to Interstate 20. As Officer Grubbs exited the cruiser to approach Blasingame, he [Blasingame] took off running across two lanes of traffic. The officer pursued Blasingame onto the shoulder of the road and despite orders to stop from the officer, Blasingame continued to flee and crossed over a roadside guardrail. Officer Grubbs was not in imminent fear since Blasingame was unarmed. As the pursuit intensified, “Blasingame made his way towards an opening in the brush with a steep decline” with the highway visible below. With no verbal warning, Officer Grubbs fired his taser, striking Blasingame in the back. As a result, Blasingame fell down the steep embankment and “hit his head on the concrete platform of a utility box.” Emergency medical services were called to transport Blasingame to the hospital where it was determined that he suffered serious injuries including traumatic brain damage and a spinal injury causing substantial paralysis. Blasingame was cited for two misdemeanor offenses: “(1) pedestrian solicitation on a roadway in violation of O.C.G.A. 40-6-97 and (2) obstruction of a law enforcement officer in violation of O.C.G.A. 17-4-6.”
Blasingame’s guardian and conservator (Keith Edwards) sued Officer Grubbs and the City of Atlanta, for the following claims: “(1) a Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force against Officer Grubbs and the City; (2) a state-law assault and battery claim against Officer Grubbs; and (3) a state-law respondeat superior claim against the City.” Only the first claim will be discussed here since the “district court granted an unopposed partial summary judgment motion on the respondeat superior claim,” and the court entered a “stipulated order for voluntary dismissal” of the assault and battery claim.
In August 2022, a trial ensued for the Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. “At the close of the defendants’ case, the district court denied Officer Grubbs’ Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity grounds.” The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for compensatory and punitive damages against the City and Officer Grubbs.
After the trial, “the district court denied Officer Grubbs’ renewed Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity grounds” and “reduced the punitive damages award against him.” Furthermore, “the district court granted the City’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, overturned the jury’s verdict against the City, and held that Mr. Edwards did not prove that the City’s policies, customs, or practices were the moving force behind Officer Grubbs’ unconstitutional conduct.”
The 11th circuit court considered “the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law to Officer Grubbs based on qualified immunity.” He argued that “the court improperly denied him the protections of qualified immunity because…he did not violate Mr. Blasingame’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force.”
Government officials sued in their individual capacity may assert qualified immunity. “The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials who perform discretionary functions from civil liability when their conduct does not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna.
It was undisputed that when the taser was discharged by Officer Grubbs, he “was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.” Therefore, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that qualified immunity does not apply. The plaintiff must prove “(1) a violation of a constitutional right (2) that ‘was clearly established at the time of [Officer Grubbs’] alleged misconduct.’” Underwood v. City of Bessemer. Furthermore, the plaintiff [Edwards] “must satisfy both prongs of the analysis to overcome a defense of qualified immunity.” Bailey v. Wheeler.
The first prong goes to the violation of a constitutional right, the Fourth Amendment, which “forbids the use of excessive force to apprehend a suspect.” Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686, 699 (11th Cir. 2021). “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
The 11th circuit considered six factors in evaluating the officer’s use of force:
“(1) the severity of the suspect’s crime, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat of harm to others, (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest of trying to flee, (4) the need for the use of force, (5) the relationship between the need for force and the amount of force used, and (6) how much injury was inflicted.”
If the force is “lethal”, the court must also consider whether the officer had “probable cause to believe the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others or that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm” and whether the officer gave “some warning about the possible use of deadly force, if feasible.” Bradley v. Benton, 10 F.4th 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir 2021).
“The use of a taser is not per se deadly force.” However, “tasing a person who is at an elevated height may come with a substantial risk of serious bodily harm or death.” Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1241. Blasingame was headed down a steep, 30-ft long embankment, when Officer Grubbs tased him in the back. Blasingame fell and “hit his head on the concrete platform of a utility box” on the highway below. The 11th circuit concluded that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find a Fourth Amendment violation. The court’s analysis of the officer’s use of force is as follows:
(1). “Mr. Blasingame committed the misdemeanor offense of panhandling. O.C.G.A. 40-6-97(b).” At the time of the encounter with Officer Grubbs, Blasingame had not committed, nor was he suspected of committing a serious or dangerous crime. (2). Blasingame did not pose a threat to Officer Grubbs or his partner. “Officer Grubbs testified that he never saw a weapon on Blasingame. And he acknowledged that Mr. Blasingame never threatened him nor put him in ‘imminent fear’ of his life.” (3). “The evidence at trial showed that Mr. Blasingame ran away from the officers” and was not “given a chance to finally comply before force was used. Officer Grubbs admitted that he never gave any verbal warning before deploying his taser.” (4). While some use of force was minimally necessary to prevent Blasingame’s escape, and to prevent him from entering the highway, this court found that the use of force went beyond minimal. (5). The relationship between the justification for force and the level of force used favors the plaintiff. Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1243 (using “this level of force to stop an unarmed man who was not suspected of committing a violent crime from fleeing on foot…is excessive”); (6). The injuries inflicted on Blasingame were severe. His skull was crushed, and because of the spinal cord injury he sustained, he was rendered quadriplegic.
After considering these six factors, the court determined that the first qualified immunity prong was met.
As to the second prong, “Clearly established means that, at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63, 138 S.Ct. 577, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018).
A right may be clearly established for qualified immunity purposes in one of three ways: (1) case law with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law.
The court used the third method to make the determination. “…A general constitutional rule may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though the very action in question has not previously been held unlawful.” Under similar circumstances in Bradley, the Eleventh Circuit court held that “tasing a non-dangerous and unarmed fleeing suspect on an elevated surface under similar circumstances — the suspect was atop an eight-foot wall when shot — is ‘obviously unconstitutional even absent a case directly on point.’” Like in Bradley, Blasingame did not pose an immediate threat to Officer Grubbs, nor was he “suspected of committing a crime involving infliction of serious physical harm. Yet, without any warning, Officer Grubbs applied deadly force to prevent his escape from the stop on foot.”
Summarily, “the Fourth Amendment violation here — deployment of a taser against a non-violent, non-dangerous, and unarmed suspect fleeing down a steep embankment— was one of obvious clarity.” Because the plaintiff’s burden was satisfied, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer Grubbs and upheld the liability verdict against him. Edwards v Grubbs, 169 F.4th 1261 (March 13, 2026).
On cases involving a roadblock, take a Certified copy of the Roadblock Supervisor Approval Form and the Final Report Form to the ALS Hearing. The certified documents must be provided to the court.
The Department of Public Safety Legal Review is published with the approval of
Colonel W. W. Hitchens III
Legal Division
Joan Crumpler, Director Clare McGuire, Deputy Director
Dee Brophy, ALS Attorney
Nkenge Green, Open Records Attorney Manager Shanna Lewallen, Legal Intern
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