Georgia Court of Appeals

Officers Lacked Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion Of Criminal Activity for Detaining Defendant

While on routine patrol in the Nellie B. Homes area at approximately 10:30 pm, Officer Fields observed a Chrysler sedan backed into a cul-de-sac parking space with its headlights illuminated. An hour earlier, Officer Holcombe observed the same vehicle in the same position in the parking space. Both officers had previously responded to the area to investigate violent crimes, drug crimes, and had recovered stolen vehicles in the area where the sedan was parked. In addition, complaints of loitering had been received.

To investigate further, both officers drove toward the sedan, exited their vehicles and approached the occupants of the sedan. After identifying the occupants, Officer Fields ran their names Randolph (the driver) and Perez (the passenger) and both were flagged for “known to carry a weapon” and Perez was also flagged for “known to sell and use drugs” and “known to threaten police”. Shortly after speaking with Randolph and Perez, Randolph’s wife arrived on the scene in a Chevrolet SUV and gave a conflicting statement (from her husband’s account) of why he was on the scene. Because of the conflicting statements given by Randolph and his wife, Officer Fields requested a K-9 officer to conduct an open-air sniff of the sedan, whereby he asked Randolph and Perez to exit the vehicle. Next, Officer Fields observed an open backpack that contained green, leafy material believed to be marijuana inside the vehicle next to Perez’s feet. The officers proceeded to handcuff the men, followed by a search of the backpack, the vehicle and Randolph’s person.

Randolph was “indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a publicly owned housing project. He filed a motion to suppress/motion in limine, seeking to exclude any evidence obtained [from the]… detention and search.” The trial court denied the motion and concluded “that the police had reasonable and articulable suspicion that [Randolph and Perez] were involved in criminal activity to justify a brief detention and to request that the Defendants exit their vehicle.”

“Randolph obtained a certificate of immediate review of the trial court’s order,” and was granted an application for interlocutory appeal by the Court of Appeals.

On appeal, the court reviewed Georgia law on the three tiers of police-citizen encounters: “verbal communications that involve no coercion or detention; brief stops or seizures that must be accompanied by a reasonable suspicion; and arrests, which can be supported only by probable cause.” State v. Copeland, 310 Ga. 345, 351, (2)(b), 850 S.E.2d 736 (2020). In State v. Mrozowski (2024), the Court of Appeals stated that in a first-tier police-citizen encounter, “an officer may approach citizens, ask for identification, ask for consent to search, and otherwise freely question the citizen without any basis or belief of criminal activity so long as the police do not detain the citizen or convey the message that the citizen may not leave.” In Copeland, the court stated a second-tier encounter occurs when an officer gains a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the citizen is in the process of committing or has committed a crime, whereby the officer has the authority to detain the citizen for an investigative stop. In a third-tier encounter, the officer is authorized to make an arrest and take the citizen into custody because he has probable cause. He is essentially acting on a belief that the individual is committing or has committed a crime.

At trial, Officer Fields testified that when he and the other officer drove into the cul-de-sac, they parked their vehicles in front of the sedan which prevented it from driving away. He also testified that the occupants of the sedan were not free to leave. Consequently, Randolph’s encounter with the officers was a second-tier investigative detention, which required the officers to have reasonable, articulable (clear and distinct) suspicion that Randolph was or was about to be involved in criminal activity.

When considering the legality of a second-tier investigative detention, Georgia appellate courts have frequently recognized that “a person’s mere presence in a high crime area does not give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, even if police observe conduct which they believe is consistent with a general pattern of such activity.” Bien-Aime v. State, 361 Ga. App. 645, 652(1), 865 S.E.2d 224 (2021).

“Because the officers lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity prior to detaining Randolph, the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the detention and subsequent search.” Randolph v. State, No. A26A0015, 2026 WL 1075882, (Ga. Ct. App., April 21, 2026).

Georgia Court of Appeals

Defendant Not Entitled to Immunity Under Georgia 9-1-1 Medical Amnesty Law

“Late one night in March 2022, a law enforcement officer responded to a 911 call that a vehicle was stopped in a turning lane with an unconscious driver at the wheel.” Upon approaching the vehicle, “the officer was able to wake the driver, who identified himself as White.” Paramedics called to the scene to evaluate White “confirmed that he was not having a medical emergency and then left the scene.” The officer noted that White was disoriented and that his eyes were bloodshot and glassy. However, he did not detect an “odor of alcohol or any other signs of impairment. White claimed he suffered from narcolepsy and that he had taken Xanax two days earlier. The officer ran White’s license and discovered an outstanding warrant for a probation violation.” He then arrested White and upon searching him, a small bag containing white powder, later identified as fentanyl, was recovered.

White was charged with possession of a controlled substance, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §16-13-30(a):

“Except as authorized by this article, it is unlawful for any person to purchase, possess, or have under his or her control any controlled substance.”
He asserted “his immunity from prosecution because he was the subject of a call for medical assistance related to a drug overdose, pursuant to O.C.G.A. §16-13-5. Following a hearing, the trial court denied White’s request for immunity. White filed his application for interlocutory appeal, which was granted.”

“White contends that the trial court erred by [misinterpreting] O.C.G.A. §16-13-5, and concluding that he was not entitled to the protections under that statute because the drug charge did not arise solely from the call for medical assistance.”

The Court of Appeals disagreed and based its finding on Purdee v. State, 376 Ga. App. 836, 837(1), 921 S.E.2d 88., “… we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would. If the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an end.”

Relevant to this case, O.C.G.A. §16-13-5(b) provides:

Any person who is experiencing a drug overdose and, in good faith, seeks medical assistance for himself or herself or is the subject of such a request shall not be arrested, charged, or prosecuted for a drug violation if the evidence for the arrest, charge, or prosecution of such drug violation resulted solely from seeking such medical assistance.

White contends that the term “solely” in the Code section is vague and must be strictly interpreted against the State. Hale v. State, 262 Ga. App. 710, 711, 586 S.E.2d 372 (2003). He contends that the statute must be read to mean “that there can be no intervening or subsequent cause to authorize a search that may then lead to a drug charge if the initial cause for police presence is responding to an overdose.”

However, his “interpretation does not conform to a natural and reasonable reading of O.C.G.A. §16-13-5(b).” When properly interpreted, “O.C.G.A. §16-13-5(b) limits its protection to only one instance: when the incriminating evidence is the fruit of the call for help.” And by “limiting the origin of the evidence, the statute necessarily contemplates there may be any number of circumstances resulting in the recovery of incriminating evidence to which immunity would not apply.” Under the circumstances of this matter, “there is evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the fentanyl was the fruit of the outstanding arrest warrant – not of the seeking of medical assistance.”

In this case, “White had committed another crime – a parole violation.” In connection with his arrest for that crime, “the officer’s search revealed the narcotics in White’s pocket.” Consequently, “White was not entitled to immunity under O.C.G.A. §16-13-5(b) or (c).” Judgment affirmed. White v. State, No. A26A0027, 2026 WL 1143353, (Ga. Ct. App., April 28, 2026).