DPS Legal Review

Georgia Supreme Court

Trial Court Correctly Admitted Body-Cam Video Footage

On the night of March 16, 2007, Barry Buchanan was shot and killed outside of his apartment where he lived with two roommates. He had been the victim of a burglary and robbery and was shot trying to flee from the robbers. Barry Buchanan’s girlfriend, who was parked outside the apartment waiting for Buchanan, observed “two teenage boys” run out of Buchanan’s apartment carrying clothes. A fingerprint was lifted “from a window screen that had been removed to access the apartment” and was ran through a national database. However, when the police were unable to match the fingerprint to anyone, the investigation went inactive.
Years later, in December 2018, police ran the fingerprint again and the search returned a match to Jerry Hodges. Police attempted to locate Hodges at his mother’s residence and left a business card when no one answered. The police later “compiled a photo lineup using a photograph of Hodges that was age-appropriate from around the time of the crimes.” Buchanan’s girlfriend “positively identified Hodges as the shooter during a photo lineup.”
After the issuance of an arrest warrant, “a police officer conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle in which Hodges was a passenger.” Hodges gave a false name when identifying himself to the officer. The officer discovered “that the information provided did not match the police database,” and subsequently learned Hodge’s true identify. The officer further uncovered an active warrant and upon hearing that he was going to be arrested, Hodges fled the traffic stop on foot and was quickly apprehended after being tased. “The arrest and foot chase were recorded on the officer’s body camera.”
At trial, a portion of the video was played to the jury. Hodges was convicted of malice murder, armed robbery, burglary and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting video evidence from police body camera footage showing him fleeing after being pulled over. Defendant maintains that the video was substantially more unfairly prejudicial than probative under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”).
Under Rule 403, “[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[.]”

…there is no mechanical solution for this balancing test, and that in each case, a trial court must undertake a considered evaluation of the proffered justification for the admission of such evidence and make an independent determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In reviewing issues under Rule 403, we look
at the evidence in a light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact. Decisions regarding relevance are committed to the sound discretion ofthe trial court, and the exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy that should be used only sparingly.

Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. 579, 582-83,

At trial, Hodges acknowledged the relevance of showing a limited portion of the video to allow the arresting officer to establish identification, since the arresting officer “could not identify the person he arrested in court.” However, he preferred to admit only a still photo of his face, rather than the video clip which was merely one segment showing only his face. The video clip did not include any of the potentially problematic matters identified by the court, such as the circumstances of the foot chase. Hodges did not explain how the limited video-clip segment was unfairly prejudicial. The Court held that, under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion “in refusing to exclude the limited body-cam footage under Rule 403.” Hodges v. State, No. S26A0685, 2026 WL 1391125, (May 19, 2026).
853 S.E.2d 111 (2020).

Georgia Court of Appeals

Trial Court Correctly Denied Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence From Traffic Stop

On March 9, 2022, Officer Jeffrey Krueger with the City of Lawrenceville Police Department, was in the process of surveilling a residence, the home’s owner and her Jeep due to an anonymous tip about illegal drug activity. While parked at an abandoned home across the street, the officer saw a man, identified as Joshua Moss exit the residence. Moss approached the Jeep parked outside and a Nissan Altima. Afterwards, Moss returned inside the house before emerging again with two bags which he placed inside the Jeep’s engine compartment. The officer suspected that this activity was drug related. The officer ran the Jeep’s tag which returned as belonging to the home’s owner, Katie Wardlaw. Next, he “contacted the investigator who initially received the drug complaint and was told to leave the area because undercover vehicles” were enroute. The officer left and parked at a nearby business instead. He “waited until the Jeep began driving, and initiated a traffic stop based on a suspected window-tint violation.” The stop was captured on his patrol car’s dashcam and on his body camera.
Upon approaching the vehicle, he identified Moss as the driver and Wardlaw as the passenger. Next, “he placed his window-tint meter on the windshield [which] returned results confirming the tint exceeded the legal limit.” The officer relayed his findings to Moss and Wardlaw and observed “a wallet on Moss’s lap containing a good deal of money.” While conversing with Moss, a K-9 officer responded to the scene along with other backup officers. The K-9 officer performed a free-air sniff of the vehicle while one backup officer ran Moss and Wardlaw’s information. Another officer wrote a citation for the window-tint violation. The K-9 alerted during the free-air sniff and a subsequent search uncovered two bags under the hood – the same bags placed inside the engine compartment by Moss. The bags contained a handgun, suspected methamphetamine, and other drugs. The search of Moss uncovered a substantial sum of money, and an AR-15 pistol was found inside the vehicle.
As a result of the items found during the traffic stop, law enforcement obtained a search warrant for Wardlaw’s residence where other illegal drugs and drug-related paraphernalia were discovered. Only the items found during the traffic stop and the court’s ruling thereof will be discussed here.

Moss was charged with drug and firearm-related offenses. Moss filed a motion to suppress the evidence and after a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
The trial court found that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion and probable cause to stop the vehicle due to the illegal window-tint violation. The court further held that no evidence was put forth that “the stop was prolonged beyond the point necessary to investigate the window-tint violation because the free-air sniff was done while that investigation was ongoing.”
On appeal, Moss argued “the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence when the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged.”
The Court of Appeals disagreed and looked to a Georgia Supreme Court decision in which the court held:

a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution. A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission.

State v. Allen, 298 Ga. at 4(2)(a), 779 S.E.2d 248 (2015)

“After the tasks related to the investigation of the traffic violation and processing of the citation” are complete, “an officer cannot continue to detain an individual without reasonable articulable suspicion. And reasonable, articulable suspicion ‘requires a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that a citizen is involved in criminal activity.’” Terry v. State, 358 Ga. App. at 200(1), 854 S. E.2d 366 (2021).

As for the free-air sniff, when carried out during a traffic stop, it is not aptly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission because it is a measure designed to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Thus, “prolonging a traffic stop to conduct an open-air dog sniff ‘renders the seizure unlawful, even if that process adds very little time to the stop.’” Terry, 358 Ga. App. at 200(1).
However, the events of the traffic stop were concurrent as seen by Officer Krueger testing the window tint with his meter, the discussion of the window-tint violation with Moss and Wardlaw, the free-air sniff, and the writing of the window-tint citation. While each thing was happening and at the time the free-air sniff was being conducted, the purpose of the stop was not yet completed. Thus, the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress the evidence of the search was proper. Moss v. State, No. A26A0059, 2026 WL 1504754, (Ga. Ct. App., May 29, 2026).